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‘Which Way Does It Go 
between You Two?’ Modes of 
Interdisciplinary Intervention
Abstract: Interdisciplinarity is often imagined as a specific 
mode of practice, one that works by carefully separating 
different sets of expertise from one another (e.g. wherein a 
philosopher does conceptual work, and a neuroscientist simply 
collects data). This chapter, by contrast, radically opens up 
the range of legitimate modes of interdisciplinary practice. 
It analyses, and works through, three different, entangled, 
modes of interdisciplinary practice that have undergirded 
our own research – co-authorship, co-experimentation, 
and co-organization. The chapter ends with a call to retire 
formulations of interdisciplinarity that delineate sets of 
expertise and practice from the outset.
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Felicity and a scientific collaborator are giving a joint presentation at a 
conference on social consequences that arise from the neurosciences. They 
have a carefully choreographed set of slides, which demand them passing 
the ball – as it were – a number of times, one to the other, so as to ensure 
that each presents different kinds of empirical and conceptual data. Each 
ventriloquizes some of the scientific figures who feature in their analysis 
of the emergence of the field of resting state fMRI; at times, one completes 
the slide that the other has started out presenting. It’s perhaps difficult, if 
you didn’t know either of them, to discern who is the social scientist, and 
who the neuroscientist. Then it’s time for questions. Someone in the front 
raises her hand, looks from one to the other with a somewhat baffled 
expression, and says, “Which way does it go between you two?” She looks 
at Felicity. “I mean, do you study him?” She looks at Felicity’s collabora-
tor. “Or ... ?”
Introduction
What does a meaningful interdisciplinary intervention involving the 
humanities, social sciences, and neurosciences look like? Certainly we 
have been in spaces, and read papers, where there has been an assump-
tion that it means someone not trained in the neurosciences participating 
in a project where some measure of brain activity is deployed (e.g. with 
philosophers parsing the concepts at stake such that phenomenological 
distinctions are made empirically testable; see, for example, Farrer and 
Frith 2002; Gallagher 2000). In this chapter, we will suggest that such 
configurations should not be seen as the only way in which ‘interdiscipli-
narity’ across the social sciences, neurosciences, and humanities might 
happen – not least because such models tend to leave unperturbed the 
usual epistemological divisions of labour between different disciplines.
Some of our own interdisciplinary and collaborative interventions 
have indeed oscillated around the fMRI scanner (see Fitzgerald et al. 
2014a); others have involved in-depth work on the history of concepts 
(see Callard and Margulies 2014); some have taken the form of shared 
workshop organizing, or paper planning, or grant writing or advice seek-
ing; still others have involved simply conversing. In what follows, we are 
going to shy away from providing any definitive answer vis-à-vis what a 
‘good’ mode of interdisciplinary intervention might look like. Instead, as 
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an attempt to broaden some assumptions about what constitutes an inter-
disciplinary moment in the first place, we outline three modes through 
which we have intervened within the capacious field of interdisciplinary 
neuroscience. Some of our attempts worked well; others, quite a bit less 
so; at least one other ongoing effort could still go either way. In another 
case, a good collaboration got off the ground only after the two of us 
had moved out of the way. But the key is that, in each case, something 
took place outside of a model in which representatives from a number 
of disciplines lay their knowledge next to one another without any seri-
ous entanglement in the methods, logics and principles of those other 
disciplines. The three modes we will consider here are: (1) co-authoring; 
(2) co-experimenting; (3) co-organizing. Only one features the work of 
a brain scanner, although even here the constellation of experimental 
subjects, experimenters, and technologies – alongside the interpretations 
of what they and we collectively produced – is rather different from what 
is usually attempted via an interdisciplinary intervention.
Let us stress two things in advance: (i) These modes do not constitute 
a full palette of options. Notably absent here, for example, is the ‘ELSI’ 
mode of intervention (i.e. in which social scientists and others gather 
around a scientific project in order to do the ‘Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Implications’ part of it). This is left out not because we think it unimpor-
tant. We sidestep it partly because we have never inhabited this position, 
but also (and not unrelatedly) because we retain a strong suspicion that, 
in its careful parsing of duties and expertise, the ELSI mode is not only 
a weak form of interdisciplinarity, but is in some ways precisely the 
opposite of what we always taken interdisciplinary collaboration to consist 
of (see Balmer et al. 2012 for a lament; see Strathern and Rockhill 2013 
for an interesting analysis). (ii) We make no claim that we have initiated 
these modes: in multiple ways, we have built on and learnt from others’ 
practice. Additionally, we have a strong sense – which has been further 
consolidated by numerous people asking us for specific details of how 
we ended up doing the kind of projects that we have become involved 
in – that it might be useful to provide some more informal accounts of, 
and reflections on, our own experience of various collaborative modes, 
which might allow readers new to such formations to peer behind the 
curtain of interdisciplinary collaborative work. In short, we want the 
chapter, first, to augment and organize the variety of methods, and 
modes of collaboration, that any of us might undertake when conduct-
ing interdisciplinary work involving the mind and brain; and, second, to 
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offer some honest reflections on how, and for what purposes, we and our 
collaborators initiated and then persisted in carrying out interventions 
across those modes, despite frequent frustrations and setbacks.
Co-authoring
A collaborative bond – like any relationship, we are tempted to say – 
can come from anywhere, and be pursued in any variety of ways. For 
one of us (FC), the most important collaborative relationship, with a 
neuroscientist, emerged from the discovery of a range of shared intel-
lectual affinities during a residential workshop. Immediately on leaving 
the workshop, the two of them began a correspondence, based around 
a call for articles that had just emerged, in which they considered how 
they might work together to make an interesting contribution. What is 
striking, in retrospect – and here our account is of course written from 
the perspective of FC – is that their shared interest in the call was an 
attempt to ensure ongoing social contact; notably, the implicit offer from 
one of them to the other to co-write an article was only one of various 
mechanisms that could have achieved such a purpose. Even more strik-
ing in the formation of this collaboration was that there was no identified 
research problem that the proposed co-authorship was being called upon 
to fill; this runs counter to many formal encomia for interdisciplinarity, 
in which different disciplines are often imagined as coming together to 
answer particular (already identified and identifiable) problems. Nor 
was there any legible reason why someone working in neuroanatomy 
and someone who was at that point based in a health services depart-
ment and working on patients’ and family members’ conceptualizations 
of genetics (FC) would feel that the other was especially well placed to 
enrich his or her line of research inquiry. Indeed, the only real shared 
point of contact was some interest in a field (psychoanalysis) that was 
marginal to both of their primary research priorities (as well as marginal 
to the practices of ‘science’ in toto).
They ended up circling around the neuroscientist’s field of research – 
the field of resting state fMRI (which measures low-frequency fluctuations 
to investigate spontaneous activity in the brain and hence to understand 
the functional architecture of the brain). In the course of the next two 
years, these collaborators wove tight webs of social and intellectual inter-
est around that point of conjuncture. Without significant external grant 
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support, they co-wrote papers, and co-presented talks, that investigated 
the intriguing and heterogeneous origins of resting state fMRI research 
(for an internalist history of this field, see Snyder and Raichle 2012). For 
FC, this collaboration comprised an extraordinary, new opportunity to 
read and think – and then write – with a neuroscientist whose generos-
ity and willingness to open up, and explain to her, the theoretical and 
methodological complexities of his field allowed her to become proficient 
in a wholly new corner of the neurosciences. FC conjectured that this 
collaboration, for the neuroscientist, potentially offered the opportunity 
to go back to identify and (re)interpret some of the foundational papers 
within his field in conversation with someone ‘coming from the outside’.
As the collaboration developed, these two researchers developed 
a paper on the current status of the ‘default mode network’ (DMN) 
(widely understood to be the set of brain regions that are engaged when 
people are in a ‘resting state’ – i.e. left to themselves in a scanner, with 
no explicit task instruction). In it, they suggested that the DMN would 
not necessarily remain at the centre of future research that attempted 
to understand the relationship between brain dynamics and the mecha-
nisms of thought. In other words, they raised the possibility that the 
current, apparently foundational, concept would not necessarily remain 
at the centre of its field. Co-authoring a publication such as this opens 
different possibilities, and carries different risks, depending on one’s 
disciplinary location. For a cultural geographer and historian of science 
(FC) to question the ontological consistency and durability of a scientific 
object is one thing – in many respects, it is one of the indispensable 
tools of her trade. However, it is often far easier to do such a thing after 
a scientific object has disintegrated and decayed – when such disinte-
gration is clearly recognizable as one looks back at a time now past – 
rather than become deeply immersed within the current scientific and 
technological practices of a field. FC speculated that for a neuroscientist, 
who might well be, in certain respects, importantly committed to that 
same scientific object (not only for his own research, but perhaps also 
for his lab members’ stability, as well as for the longevity and collegiality 
of collaborative relationships with other scientists), publishing such an 
intervention potentially carried some risks. There is, of course, a long 
tradition of debate and critique by scientists who are internal to their 
field (see Poldrack 2006; Vul et al. 2009 for two different kinds of critique 
within the field of fMRI). But in such cases, critique is most commonly 
routed through (and is legitimized around) questions of methodology; 
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research that gets to the heart of the historical, theoretical, and concep-
tual frameworks of the science are, we suggest, rarer. FC recalls that both 
authors expended significant energy, over the course of many drafts, 
adjusting the wording so that it carried enough punch for the cultural 
theorist and historian, and enough nuance for the neuroscientist: in 
particular, the many (many) annotated drafts of the article reveal, for 
her at least, ongoing, shared anxieties about the politics of word choice; 
about how, or whether, normative claims might be made; and about if 
and how to include sentences that pointed to the future of the field. And 
yet despite these risks and efforts, co-authoring brought, for FC, signifi-
cant pleasures. For a cultural theorist engaged with the history of science, 
the opportunity to co-author and publish in a scientific journal shifted 
her position of annunciation from the usual disciplinary one of external 
commentary to one of audible authority within a field. She surmised that 
for a neuroscientist, the opportunity to participate in meta-conjecture, 
and to intervene in the overarching frameworks and potential ontolo-
gies at work in one’s own field, might offer a somewhat unusual, and yet 
potentially productive, intellectual position vis-à-vis one of the scientific 
objects that is the focus of much of his research.
What collaborators cannot control, of course, is how they get read, or 
how they will be subsequently positioned against one another. At one 
stage in this process, FC followed up a shared invitation, to an interdis-
ciplinary event, to ask whether it would be of interest to hear a linked 
presentation (from both FC and her neuroscientific collaborator) that 
included some reflection on how this cross-disciplinary partnership had 
developed. She received a warm reply – but one that warned her of the 
preponderance of ‘cutting-edge neuroscience’ at the event, and thus likely 
scepticism about a talk that would go ‘too deeply into the genealogy of a 
field’. Some historical context was welcome, she was told – but perhaps 
not too much. The key was not to work too hard at ‘reaching across the 
divide’ (between the sciences and the humanities), but simply to present 
cutting-edge (neuroscientific) work. Her respondent lamented, addition-
ally, that humanists were sometimes ‘quite lazy’ and not up to speed with 
the science (this writer, we note, came from the humanities).
There are many important points embedded here – not a few of which 
we are inclined to agree with. But what is especially fascinating is the 
way in which a concern about an ostentatious reaching across the divide 
ended up not only reinscribing an unequal dyad of science (cutting-
edge, worthy of admiration, and excitement) and the humanities (that 
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which provides social and historical context, not cutting-edge), but also 
found humanists to be potentially at fault in relation to a practice that 
neuroscientists need not imagine themselves as required to undertake. 
At the same time, the interdisciplinary was positioned as being at risk 
of weakness and lack of rigour in relation to the virility of ‘cutting-edge’ 
science. Notably, there was no articulated need for either the professional 
neuroscientists or the humanities people in the audience to hear any 
‘cutting-edge’ social science or humanities scholarship. This exchange 
thus became a moment that revealed to FC how her own way of envisag-
ing her intellectual relationship with her neuroscientific collaborator, 
as well as the relations between their respective disciplines, was quite at 
odds with many other, better established spaces of/for interdisciplinary 
exchange. Her and her collaborator’s jointly authored manuscripts 
marked, for her, an attempt, by contrast, to disrupt the assumptions that 
undergirded the usual models of co-authorship and co-presentation – 
not least by situating the context and progress of the collaboration itself at 
the heart of any shared inquiry, and refusing to disentangle such context 
from the cutting-edge of the research object in question.
Co-experimenting
In 2010, one of us (DF) attended a workshop on social neuroscience, 
organized by the European Neuroscience and Society Network, at the 
University of Vienna. What attracted DF to this event was that it promised 
not only a workshop about, but also a shared experiment in, social neuro-
science: everyone who came to the event had to precirculate a design for 
a real experiment, drawing on whatever account of experimental logics 
was available to him or her. On arrival, attendees were split into teams 
with a loosely equal disciplinary mix; they attended some workshops 
on experimental design, as well as on the actual physical logic of the 
scanner – and were then more-or-less left to their own devices: the task 
was to settle on one question between them, and design an experimental 
paradigm around it – with the organizers holding out the inducement 
that one group would be supported actually to carry out its experiment. 
In the group that DF was placed in, by far the most compelling proposal 
was provided by Melissa Littlefield, then an Assistant (now Associate) 
Professor of English at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
The idea was centred on the neuroscience of lie detection: Littlefield’s 
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proposal was to turn the experimental logic of fMRI lie detection away 
from its fascination with ‘deception’, and to redirect it towards the 
nuances of ‘truth’. Given that the dynamics of truth-telling and deception 
are fundamentally social in similar ways – deception is, after all, always 
a relational disposition – the collaborators designed an experiment that 
would take a brain measure when participants told a ‘socially-awkward’ 
truth, in order to see how brain regions associated with that truth would 
map on to regions already associated with deception (see e.g. Langleben 
et al. 2005).
The subsequent experiment (this proposal was indeed the winning one, 
and the real experiment was facilitated by the Interacting Minds Centre 
at Aarhus University, Denmark) combined insights from the humanities, 
social sciences, and neurosciences: the team created a complex ecologi-
cal situation (involving team-building, the generation of in-groups and 
out-groups, and dynamics of trust and competition) designed to induce 
participants, in the scanner, to tell a difficult truth about a teammate (see 
Fitzgerald et al. 2014a for a longer account of this experiment, from the 
perspective of science and technology studies; see also Littlefield et al. 
2014; see especially Littlefield 2011 for a broader analysis of the science 
of lie detection). The hypothesis was that a neurobiological measure 
taken at this point would show activation, at the moment just prior to 
enunciation, in intensely ‘social’ brain regions previously associated with 
deception. At the heart of this experimental design was a suggestion that 
the fMRI scanner might have difficulty distinguishing between a ‘truth’ 
and a ‘lie’ – because what it means to be deceived, or to confess, is buried 
within a whole series of fraught social relationships, memories, feelings, 
sensations, and so on, whose entanglements are not well indexed by the 
hemodynamic response at stake in fMRI.
Simultaneously, the experiment was an attempt to open up how the 
adjective ‘social’ was being mobilized within social neuroscience – and 
the ways in which some deeply complex social dynamics had become 
sequestered within a series of physiological effects that happened to be 
available to brain-imaging technologies. But the form that this perspec-
tive took was not historical or social analysis (cf. a number of the essays 
in Pickersgill and van Keulen 2011); nor was it a critique of either the 
object or the method of fMRI lie detection; nor still was it a critical 
theorization of the psychological literature on social cognition. Instead, 
it was a real experiment (Fitzgerald et al. 2014b). More precisely, it was 
an experiment that recruited the implicit logics of fMRI lie detection 
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into a scenario in which precisely the opposite dynamic was at stake, 
viz. an awkward truth. The experiment used the modes of visualiza-
tion and interpretation, as well as the conceptual leaps that had made 
deception visible in particular neurobiological locations, in order to bring 
the intersubjectivity of truth to light. In this sense, a critique was made 
on the basis of an expertise – that is, Littlefield’s literary and historical 
research – that is not always available to people involved in neuroimag-
ing studies. More importantly, this expertise, and the critical interven-
tion it afforded, was articulated exclusively through the internal logics 
of fMRI brain-imaging. It would not be enough to assert that deception 
depended on context: the point was to co-design and run an experiment 
that would work with the potent and important reductive force of the 
scanner, in order to bring something like ‘context’ into view.
But co-experiment is not without its problems. More recently, DF and 
FC discussed this research at an interdisciplinary workshop concerned 
with ‘critical neuroscience’ – a term signifying the desire for a form of 
neuroscientific investigation more attentive to its own biases, limita-
tions, and political entanglements, and thereby contributing to a more 
‘critical’ (and potent) analysis of social and political relations (Slaby and 
Choudhury 2011). The lie detection project was discussed as one instance 
of what we had by then come to understand as an ‘experimental entangle-
ment’ – a term that we had introduced (Fitzgerald and Callard 2015) to 
expand the kinds of interventions that might be understood as ‘critical’ 
(see also Viney, Callard, and Woods 2015). A prominent neuroscientist, 
who happened to be in the room, responded to our presentation by 
saying (we paraphrase): ‘What’s critical about that? This is just normal 
science.’ In an important sense, this is very true. Such a question draws 
our attention to what it might mean to intervene through experimental 
modalities that do not, in fact, depart from the constrained logics of 
‘normal science’. What does it mean for the interdisciplinarian to garb 
herself in experimental procedures, such that her critical impulses might 
have the hope of passing in intellectual institutions that privilege certain 
kinds of bioscientific reasoning? (For a canonical account of some of the 
fraught literatures and histories that we are invoking here, see Chapter 6 
in Butler 1993.) And beyond such concerns, there are also of course 
cognitive neuroscientific experiments that do not consider themselves to 
be explicitly interdisciplinary, and which have mobilized the resources 
of ‘normal science’ to exert forms of critique. The famous ‘dead salmon’ 
experiment, for example, critiqued the use of poor statistical corrections 
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that generated false positives in fMRI studies, by running a ‘normal’ 
experiment that showed brain activity in a dead Atlantic salmon (Bennett, 
Wolford, and Miller 2009; see Margulies 2011 for a discussion). More 
recently, Amir Raz and colleagues drew together cognitive neuroscientific 
methods and techniques from magic to demonstrate experimentally the 
risk of ‘neurohype’ (Ali, Lifshitz, and Raz 2014). There remains an open 
question of how – if at all – interdisciplinary experimentation (of the 
kind that involves the interpretive social sciences and humanities) differs 
from modes of practice internal to the field of cognitive neuroscience.
Co-organizing
We are at an interdisciplinary networking event, with about 40 other 
people from various disciplines. Stand up; introduce yourself; give a 
thumbnail sketch of your strengths; explain what you’re looking for; sit 
back down. The day drags a bit. One neuroscientist, Simone Kühn (SK), 
in her allotted five minutes, spoke as an expert designer of experimental 
neuroscientific paradigms; she was at the workshop because she was 
potentially interested in collaborating with people from the humanities and 
social sciences who could help her investigate, assess, and interpret subjec-
tive experience. Cognitive neuroscience, she noted, was incredibly good 
at establishing objective responses to tasks designed by the experimenter, 
but still in its infancy vis-à-vis acquiring subjective data that captured 
the experimental subject’s responses to the experimental paradigm (Jack 
and Roepstorff 2002). Her pitch piqued our interest: after all, literatures 
within sociology, the history of the human sciences and geography have 
long reflected on the ‘problem’ of eliciting subjective experience and of 
adequately conceptualizing the relationality between an experimenter, an 
experimental subject, and the social and technological artefacts amongst 
them (Despret 2004; Morawski 2007). By the end of the workshop, the 
three of us were part of a larger group attempting to get funding for a new 
interdisciplinary programme of research on ‘intersubjectivity’.
With SK, we devoted significant time to planning, curating, and organ-
izing a workshop on that question. We juxtaposed researchers from 
different fields in the same panel, and forced each to respond to the same 
provocation. (For example, the provocation ‘Where is the introspective 
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self?’ was addressed by Russ Hurlburt, the psychologist who has worked 
for many years to develop a painstaking and extraordinary psychological 
method called Descriptive Experience Sampling (Hurlburt and Akhter 
2006), and the philosopher and critical neuroscientist Jan Slaby. For 
further details, see Callard et al. 2012a.) And we borrowed from our own 
experience of European Neuroscience and Society Network (ENSN) 
events to ensure that the last day was devoted to developing an actual 
protocol for some kind of empirical study, rather than the event simply 
remaining at the level of discursive exchange. Such attempts can always 
fail; indeed this is what happens more often than not. But our intention 
was to push beyond the endless ‘dialogues’ that beset interdisciplinary 
workshops – and that frequently end up simply reinstalling the ‘inter-’, 
as well as consolidating existing positions – even at the risk of failure.
Beyond the actual curation of the event itself, some of the value of 
co-organization as a mode of interdisciplinary intervention was revealed 
in offshoots from, or tangents to, the main business of the workshop. In 
the course of the event, for example, SK and her neuroscientist colleague 
Elisa Filevich presented initial findings from an innovative protocol that 
they had designed and tested to explore the vexed construct of ‘free will’. 
Working to prise open decades of black-boxed studies that have kept 
constructs out of the reach of the experimental subject, and that have 
evinced no interest in what the experimental subject interprets the study 
to be about, their paradigm focused instead on the subtleties of what 
it feels like to choose, in which the experimental subject herself adju-
dicated which decisions had felt more or less ‘freely’ selected (Filevich 
et al. 2013). We subsequently co-authored a short commentary on this 
study for the journal that published their article (Callard and Fitzgerald 
2014), in which we reinscribed this nuanced experiment within some 
other (social scientific, historical, and psychological) literatures that had 
tried to think through the fraught relationship of the experimenter to 
her subject. SK’s and Filevich’s imaginative experimental intervention 
opened up for us new possibilities for how we might, in the future, 
‘torque’ existing experimental paradigms that are focused on other 
phenomena, and that also employ complex intersubjective relations 
between the experimenter and her subject.
At the same event, an entirely new collaborative endeavour emerged. 
As we noted above, FC, DF, and SK had already ensured that Russ 
Hurlburt was part of the workshop; this was because SK had mentioned 
her interest in his work at the beginning of the exchanges between the 
‘Which Way Does It Go between You Two?’
DOI: 10.1057/9781137407962.0005
three of them. On the final day of the event, likely collaborators were 
more-or-less forced – via highly curated groups – into extended interac-
tions with one another, and instructed to return with the outline of a 
collaborative experiment. Most of these conversations did not produce 
anything very concrete (and this was fine) – but a fascinating interdis-
ciplinary collaboration, drawing together very different traditions of 
psychological and neuroscientific experimentation on introspection, 
did emerge from the conversation between SK, Russ Hurlburt, Charles 
Fernyhough (CF), and others (Kühn et al. 2014). For FC and DF, the key 
mode of interdisciplinary intervention, here, was to use this workshop 
as a vehicle to ensure that likely collaborators were pushed to work with 
one another – and, critically, for the two of them to get out of the way 
once this curatorial work was done, and they were no longer required. 
Interdisciplinarity, here, was located first in the curatorial labour of 
bringing SK’s, CF’s, and Russ Hurlburt’s different, psychologically-rooted 
research traditions together (and we are absolutely committed to the 
view that the joining of heterogeneous psychological and neuroscientific 
traditions, rooted in profoundly different epistemological histories, is an 
intensely interdisciplinary endeavour), and generating the space for an 
experimental conversation to take place. But there was also a significant 
interdisciplinary intervention in knowing when to get out of the way: a 
more traditionally-minded mode would have insisted that, for this to be 
a truly interdisciplinary effort, it must include some ‘perspective’ from 
the social sciences and/or humanities. Such a view not only flattens 
the historical and internal multiplicity of such a capacious discipline as 
psychology, but also makes invisible the vital interdisciplinary labour of 
simply bringing things together. We are insistent, by contrast, that the 
generation of space, the curatorial labour of choreographing encounters, 
and then the willingness to know when your disciplinary perspective 
is not necessarily adding anything important, remain crucial, if under-
appreciated, ways to do interdisciplinary collaboration.
So ... which way does it go between you two?
The answer, of course, is that in interdisciplinary collaborations it can 
go many ways. We have here offered three modes – but no doubt this 
barely scratches the surface. What we wish to stress is that the tired 
distinction between whether one labours ‘on’ or ‘in’ another discipline, 
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or the desire to pin down who is more likely to be the ‘object’ of study 
within a collaboration, is surely long past the age of retirement. Let us 
dispense, then, with the two-pronged formulation whereby the role of 
the social scientist/humanities scholar is either to critique neuroscientific 
concepts ‘from the outside’, as it were, or to provide a contextualization 
of the empirical data that have been acquired by the neuroscientists 
themselves. Let us, by the same notion, do away with the mirrored 
image of the neuroscientist either as a sort of crude empiricist, waiting 
patiently for the philosopher to sort out her concepts, or as an external 
intellectual imperialist, blithely washing sociological histories away with 
her all-conquering brain machine.
If we understand interdisciplinary interventions, instead, as ways of 
marking, folding, and perturbing the existing order of the world, then 
interdisciplinary collaborations might take place in an untold number 
of ways. These could include written arguments, the performative 
power of heterogeneous experimental situations, and elaborations of 
the discursive and paradigmatic constraints within which researchers 
from both the sciences and the humanities/interpretive social sciences 
work. They might also include shared applications, the joint labour of 
workshop organization, shared senses of joy and rage at the decisions of 
grant committees – as well as the whole, unspoken panoply of ways for 
thinking, together, about the intersections of culture, society, environ-
ment, mind, and brain.
Notes & Queries: 2
Q: Can you give a quick list of other possible ways, however seemingly 
small or minor, of actually making an interdisciplinary intervention?
A: There is no easily circumscribable list of things that would count 
as interdisciplinary interventions. Rather, we consider it more 
helpful to think about an intervention as the act of stepping in to 
affect a course of action, or an issue. This can be through a variety 
of means – and could mean stepping in and thereby preventing 
something from happening. Many acts might, then, be worthy of 
consideration, for example:
acting as the reader of a draft written by someone in another  
field;
carefully setting up respondents at workshops or shared meetings; 
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watching an experiment that someone in another discipline is  
conducting (given that the act of observation can often influence 
what happens next in predictable and unpredictable ways);
disrupting what you perceive to be the deathly curation of an  
interdisciplinary event that seems to be able to do no more than 
encourage ‘dialogue between the disciplines’;
putting your foot down about being tagged ‘the (one) neurosci- 
entist’ or ‘the (one) social scientist’ at an interdisciplinary event;
attending more carefully to what might be described as ‘interdis- 
ciplinary’ differences that are working themselves out within an 
apparently disciplinary space.
This list could go on and on (and for some other examples, see the 
‘project shorts’ in Fernyhough, Woods, and Patton 2015). What we 
want to emphasize, here, is not the specifics of those acts enumer-
ated above, but rather our general starting point. We want to depart 
from thinking at the level of a ‘discipline’ – which then rapidly 
moves into interdisciplinary situations that bring one discipline 
‘into conversation’ with another discipline – and attend to other 
scales and logics at which something different might take place. A 
mode of interdisciplinary intervention, in this view, is constituted 
by some perturbation in the neatly bounded landscapes of intel-
lectual labour; it is the work of actually refusing those boundaries 
in the first place.
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